

## Introduction

The Korean peninsula remains one of the world's flashpoints. Although some progress was made during the historic summit between South Korea (Republic of Korea (ROK)) and North Korea, peace and reunification are still beyond reach. Ministerial discussions between the two Koreas have been intermittent. North Korea still maintains one of the largest, forward-deployed armies in the world. This offensive posture—coupled with North Korea's lethal special operations forces, its development of ballistic missiles, and its aggressive program to acquire weapons of mass destruction—causes the Korean peninsula to remain highly volatile.

Military planners expect that a resumption of hostilities will begin with a sudden, rapid North Korean invasion of South Korea. Thus, the commands' (United Nations Command; Combined Forces Command; Headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea (HQ, USFK); and the Service component commands within theater) logistical concerns are the timely support of U.S., South Korean, and allied units in a hostile environment and the swift evacuation of noncombatants from the combat zone. A viable wartime host nation support program is a key force enabler to make these happen should a resumption of hostilities commence in the Korean theater.

## Historical Comparison

According to Field Manual (FM) 100-10, *Combat Service Support*, "Provision of support from the host nation reduces the requirement to deploy Combat Service Support units. This allows more combat power to deploy quickly." Under the concept of velocity management, U.S. forces must expeditiously deploy anywhere in the world to fully support a unified command. By the same token, the commander-in-chief of a unified command needs the flexibility to direct and prioritize the flow of assets into his theater to sustain mobilization efforts. If items are commercially available from the local population, there is no need to ship them into a theater of operations. This maximizes shipping space to accommodate the rapid delivery of vital supplies, equipment, materiel, and personnel to

## Logistical Force Enabler In Korea . . .

# WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT

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*"The ROK-US Alliance is built on the principle of Katchi-Kapshida, 'We go together.'"*

—General Thomas A. Schwartz  
Commander-in-Chief  
United Nations Command/  
Combined Forces Command and  
Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

the foxhole where they are most urgently needed.

During World War II, the Allies realized that local support would help to alleviate the strain placed on shipping demands to support operations in North Africa and, eventually, in Sicily and the Italian mainland. Consequently, as an integral part of the agreement to take Italy out of the war, the post-fascist government was to provide 23,000 rations, 355 trucks, 12 ambulances, 120 tons of petroleum products, 12 switchboards, 150 field telephones, 100 picks, 200 shovels, 5,000 wire pickets, 150 miles of barbed wire, a 500-man labor pool, and airfield facilities to assist in an Allied airdrop to defend Rome against German occupation.

Locally procured goods and indigenous personnel are needed more than ever to reduce the logistical tail, especially in South Korea. Today's more lethal, heavier equipment and the demand to rapidly deploy combat units to an area of operation have caused military planners to consider alternative means to make optimal use of constrained transportation assets.

The "logistical revolution" calls for the "just-in-time" delivery of personnel and materiel. However, in contrast to World War II, the logistical demands of modern military units are immense. Today's main battle tank is a lot heavier than any of its predecessors. The amount of local support that the Allies demanded from the Italians in 1943 would be a drop in the bucket by today's standards. U.S. forces would easily consume thousands of tons of fuel, ammunition, and supplies during a modern deployment. Furthermore, the speeds in which units deploy and operations commence and end have increased tremendously. Compare Operation Desert Storm to the lengthy military campaigns of both world wars.

The need to rapidly deploy units and materiel to sustain mobilization operations on the Korean peninsula is crucial. Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, is within artillery range of North Korean batteries. North Korean ballistic missiles are capable of hitting any target in South Korea. Numerically superior North Korean forces are capable of overrunning United Nations, combined, and U.S. defensive positions in a blink of an eye. U.S. forces in South

Korea depend on wartime host nation support for labor; commercially available supplies and equipment; facilities to receive, stage, and integrate personnel and materiel; and vehicles to assist in the war effort. Such assistance from the South Korean government helps ensure that critically needed supplies from the United States arrive in time to sustain mobilization.

## Gulf War Lessons Learned

The Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated the need for robust wartime host nation support. FM 100-10 states, "An objective area's infrastructure is a key source of support." Before the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia used the huge revenues it received during the 1973 oil embargo to build a modern transportation infrastructure that greatly facilitated military operations. However, one of the U.S. Central Command's shortcomings during the Gulf War, and a lesson learned for the other unified commands, was its failure to establish wartime host nation agreements that specifically enumerated the responsibilities of local labor during the early stages of the conflict. Without this crucial support firmly in place, military authorities had difficulty taking advantage of the technologically advanced Saudi infrastructure. A report presented to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War stated, "Saudi Arabian infrastructure—especially airfields and ports—was well developed. ... Ramp space at these airfields was ... limited, as were ground refueling facilities. ... These constraints highlight several key points. *First, it is imperative to have pre-existing host nation support arrangements* to ensure access to arrival facilities whenever possible. A second factor illustrated by air deployment is that there were difficulties in servicing aircraft, even though Saudi Arabia has some of the most up-to-date facilities in the world. These difficulties would

certainly be exacerbated were there a requirement to deploy a similar sized force to less developed airfields."

Item	Number
Vehicles (including tractor trailers)	5,105
Personnel	23,733
Facilities and land (square meters)	24.2 million
Construction companies	17
Construction equipment	1,296
Material handling equipment (forklifts, etc.)	124
Water (liters per day)	195.4 thousand
Ships	59
Aircraft	10

Fortunately, the Korean theater has a solid, functional Wartime Host Nation Support Program. Yet, there are limitations to the level of support that the South Korean government is capable of providing.

## Wartime Host Nation Support

Wartime host nation support is authorized under the Wartime Host Nation Support Umbrella Agreement signed by the United States and the ROK in 1991. The ROK recognizes the need for an American presence to maintain stability in the Far East. Furthermore, the United States wishes to maintain a logistics infrastructure in this part of the world in the event hostilities resume.

Bilateral agreements with Korea prevent any misunderstandings over wartime host nation support requirements needed to support mobilization. The defense of South Korea would be severely limited without support from the Korean government. Under the provisions outlined in the 2001 Provisional Wartime Host Nation Support Plan, the Korean government agreed to furnish the items listed in the accompanying table.

The ROK recently emerged from an economic crisis, and its economy is still fragile. Placing too great a demand on the South Korean economy to support U.S. forces—at the expense of consumer products and the needs of its own military forces—could potentially strain the Korean market and, consequently, trigger an adverse financial reaction.

The current level of support may not be enough to fully sustain U.S. needs in the event of a contingency. But, considering the principle of velocity management and the concept of just-in-time delivery, it certainly helps. Furthermore, it is believed that the level of support will substantially increase in the event of hostilities.

Determining the level of wartime host nation support and the items to be provided is a 2-year process. U.S. requirements are forwarded to the Korean government in the even years (June 2002). The Korean government publishes the approved plan in the odd years (July/August 2003). The plan goes into effect on the first day of the next even year (January 2004).

HQ, USFK maintains a comprehensive database that delineates the support that each Service requested and the level of support provided by the South Korean government. Six months is typically expended coordinating and consolidating U.S. wartime requirements at HQ, USFK. Afterwards, wartime host nation support requirements usually take between 12-14 months of processing time to go through Korean channels. Timelines to request assistance through the Wartime Host Nation Support Program are firmly established. U.S. units must be ready to submit their requirements in a timely fashion. There is a mechanism in place to accommodate out-of-cycle requests for wartime host nation support, but this process is extremely cumbersome.

## Conclusion

The Wartime Host Nation Support Program is a viable, key force enabler to satisfy logistical needs in the Korean theater. It permits the optimization of transportation assets and cargo space. South Korea has traditionally provided vehicles, personnel, facilities, provisions, and equipment to help U.S. forces repel a sudden North Korean invasion. Learning from past wartime experiences, HQ, USFK will continue to rehearse and refine its Wartime Host Nation Support Program to meet current and future challenges.

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